Standard Pigouvian theory predicts that externalities should be corrected at the margin. However, demand distortions such as credit constraints or behavioral biases create a wedge between marginal benefit and marginal cost. While these distortions can lower aggregate abatement, they can increase the efficiency of green subsidy spending. In theory, this happens through two channels: by shifting the marginal adopter toward higher private and social benefits and by increasing demand elasticity. We test these predictions by cross-randomizing fixed cost subsidies, marginal cost subsidies, and loan access for an induction stove among 2,134 charcoal users in Kenya. Marginal cost subsidies that lower electricity costs by up to 75% have a precise zero effect on both adoption and usage. Fixed cost subsidies abate at just US$13 per ton of CO2e, and demand distortions are responsible for making this cost low: reducing credit constraints raises abatement costs to US$22 per tCO2e. These efficiency gains operate through the two hypothesized channels: demand distortions increase the marginal positive externality by 19% and lower the subsidy cost per marginal abatement by 30%. We estimate the model to generate counterfactual simulations and find that, without any distortions, abatement costs would reach US$122 per tCO2e. The social welfare gain would be US$3.1 per subsidy dollar; demand distortions increase this to US$20. These results suggest that contexts with larger demand distortions, including many low- and middle-income economies, could generate some of the lowest-cost opportunities on the abatement cost curve.…Read More

